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Absent Regions: Spaces of Financialisation in the Arab World  
 




From its early roots in Marxian political economy, the term ‘financialisation’ has emerged 
over recent years as a popular conceptual framework through which to describe and 
analyse the increased weight of financial markets within contemporary capitalism. While 
finance has always been a core feature of how capitalism operates – and, indeed, is 
intimately connected to the emergence of the world market itself – the last three decades 
has witnessed a pronounced shift in the degree to which accumulation pivots around 
financial processes. An oft-cited definition by Epstein (2006: 3) sees financialisation in 
the expansion of financial motives, markets, actors and institutions both domestically 
and internationally. Finance has “penetrated across all commercial relations to an 
unprecedented direct extent” (Fine 2010: 13), such that all capitalist social relations – 
including those between capitals, as well as those between capital and labour – are now 
mediated by interest-bearing capital (McNally 2009: 56). Underlying this shift has been a 
proliferation of new financial instruments and markets, notably based upon the 
securitisation of assets and derivative contracts, which have greatly augmented the 
volume of global financial flows, as well as increased the underlying crisis tendencies of 
the system as a whole. Importantly, this shift does not simply have economic 
implications, but has also permeated every sphere of social and cultural life 
(Christopherson et.al. 2013).  
 
There remains vigorous debate over the general concept of financialisation and related 
issues such as why finance has become ascendant, its relationship to neoliberalism and 
US hegemony (Dumenil and Levy 2005; Crotty 2005; Panitch and Gindin 2012), and 
whether it should be considered a new phase of capitalism itself (Boyer 2000; Bellamy-
Foster 2007; Lapavitsas 2013). Some scholars, most notably Christophers (2013; 2015), 
have warned that the “accumulated weight of the myriad meanings” attached to 
financialisation (Chrisophers 2015: 186) gives the notion itself only limited utility. An 
important aspect to all these discussions is empirical: what indicators are best used to 
demonstrate that processes of financialisation are actually taking place? In this respect, 
numerous contributions over the past decade have suggested different ways of measuring 
the size, influence and activity of the financial sector. Theoretically, these empirical 
trends have been connected to changes in the ways that accumulation occurs within 
capitalism, as well as the impact of financial markets on the behavior of institutions, 
individuals and states. 
 
This political economy literature provides a rich and varied set of insights into 
understanding and assessing changes to contemporary financial markets. For the 
purposes of this paper, however, two major limitations of this work should be 
highlighted. The first of these is that the vast majority of academic work on 
financialisation has concentrated on the core capitalist countries – particularly the US, 
UK and Japan (and to a lesser degree, France and Germany). As is widely acknowledged 
within the literature itself, there has been relatively little written on what financialisation 
looks like outside the advanced core.1 The work that has been done in this regard has 
been restricted to a handful of countries, notably, Brazil, South Korea and Turkey – and 
has largely focused on how these countries are inserted into global financial flows, rather 
than mapping the specificities of their own domestic financial markets.2  
 
In a related sense, the second weakness to the political economy literature is a relative 
neglect of the spatial/scalar dimensions of financialisation – a gap that has been 
particularly recognised by scholars of geography. Four years ago, French et al, made a 
challenging call to ‘financialise space and space financialisation’, arguing that there was “a 
glaring lacuna at the heart of the financialisation project; that is, its relatively uncritical 
approach to the role of space and place within monetary and financial processes” (2011: 
805). The profound spatial shifts associated with financialisation represented both an 
“analytical opportunity and political economic imperative” for integrating geography into 
the wider finance literature (Pike and Pollard 2010: 29). Particularly in the wake of the 
mutations of the global financial crisis, there was a foremost need for “for a more 
geographically sensitive reading of the myriad of processes associated with 
financialization … and the new financial spaces and practices to which it is giving rise” 
(Hall and Leyshon 2013: 832). Encouraged by calls such as these, much of the 
subsequent work within geography has reassessed the political economy literature 
through a critical but sympathetic gaze.  
 
With these two limitations in mind, I want to ask what we can learn about financial 
transformations through examining their dynamics in the Arab countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa, or what will be termed henceforth the ‘Arab world’.3 Arab 
countries have been almost completely absent from the debates on financialisation – 
“falling off the map” as Bassens et al have similarly noted in regard to World Systems 
theory and Islamic financial services (2010: 37). But as I show below, many of the 
features commonly associated with financialisation are also evident in this region. This is 
not simply a problem of incompleteness, or the need to stack up an endless series of case 
studies. Rather, if we are to take seriously the notion that capitalism is a global system 
and that the ‘whole’ is more than simply the additive sum of its parts – then, without a 
full understanding of the variegated ways in which financialisation works outside of the 
core, we lack a real appreciation of the actual phenomenon itself (even within the core).  
 
As part of this investigation of financialisation in the Arab world, I aim to show its 
deeply spatial inflexion, and thus the importance of incorporating space and scale into 
our understanding of the concept more generally. In this respect, Christophers (2015: 
192) has recently argued that we need to be wary of “geographically anaemic” 
approaches to financialisation, which treat national economies as spatially bounded and 
methodologically divorced from international flows of capital.  Financialisation is much 
more than simply the expansion (or deepening) of financial markets and institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Exceptions are the work of scholars associated with the Research on Money and Finance (RMF) and the 
International Initiative for the Promotion of Political Economy (IIPPE), which I draw upon below.  
2 See Bonizzi (2014) for literature review. 
3 This paper focuses on three main geographical areas: (1) The hydrocarbon-rich monarchies of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman; (2) 
North African countries of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt; and (3) Mashreq countries of 
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. 
within neatly circumscribed sets of social relations operating at the national scale. 
Specifically, in the Arab world, financialisation has been marked by the growing weight 
of regionally-active finance capital – most specifically, those capital groups based in the 
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Bahrain and Oman) – in circuits of capital operating at all scales. Approaching 
financialisation in this manner – moving away from methodologically nationalist 
assumptions and the literature’s largely singular focus on the advanced capitalist core – 
thus brings into focus the significance of cross-scalar accumulation patterns, their spatial 
hierarchies, and geographic unevenness.  
 
In developing this argument, the article is organised in three main parts. In the following 
section, I explore the academic literature on financialisation, its measurement, and 
various theorisations of how institutions, markets and individuals subsequently behave. 
The literature on these points is extensive, and by no means do I claim to provide a 
comprehensive survey. Rather, the aim is to distil some key observations that can be 
examined in the context of the Arab world, and to reaffirm the case made by 
geographers for the importance of financialisation’s spatiality. The two sections that 
follow concretely map financialisation in the Arab world, drawing in part upon an 
original study of the balance sheets, annual reports and shareholder information of 
around 300 banks and non-financial firms in the Arab world (using both Arabic and 
English sources). Section 3 assesses the degree to which financialisation can be said to 
exist in the region, and its impact on key sectors and institutions. It develops a range of 
indicators that demonstrate these trends – including the relative growth in financial 
assets, the changing behaviour of non-financial firms, and the composition of bank 
lending and bank income. Section 4 extends this analysis beyond the lens of the national 
scale, demonstrating that financialisation must be understood alongside the re-scaling of 
accumulation and a shifting balance of class power in the region. This has important 
implications for how we approach the concept of financialisation and its relationship to 




The seemingly unstoppable growth of financial markets and new financial instruments 
has generated scholarly debates across a range of interconnected issues. These issues 
include, most fundamentally, the place and nature of finance within wider capitalist 
accumulation – is finance ‘productive’ or a form of fictitious capital (Christophers 2013)? 
Is it a new phase of capitalism (Lapavitsas 2013, Boyer 2000), or does it signal capitalist 
stagnation in an environment of over-accumulated surplus (Bellamy-Foster 2010) or 
declining profit rates  (Brenner 2006; Harman 2009)? How does the rise of finance link 
to the seemingly endless mutations of crisis and the nature of contemporary class 
relations – both between labour and capital, as well as different fractions of capital itself 
(Albo et al 2010)? In debating all of these themes, scholars have necessarily grappled with 
what constitutes ‘finance’ – and, therefore, the ‘non-financial’ – as well as a complex set 
of questions concerning the relationship between finance, the money form, and the 
various sub-divisions of surplus value.  
 
For the purposes of the argument that follows, there are four key claims of this literature 
that need emphasis. The first of these is that financialisation is a process that brings 
fundamental changes to how accumulation takes place across all firms – not simply the 
financial sector (Krippner 2005: 182). This financialisation of the non-financial is a trend 
acknowledged in both mainstream economic literature (Gorton 2015: 279), as well as by 
more critical scholars. On the one hand, it signifies a change in how profits are generated 
– with business calculus shifting towards the maximisation of stock price and 
‘shareholder value’, rather than simply the sale of commodities (Crotty 2005: 88; also see 
Froud et al 2000). With non-financial firms connected more tightly to financial markets, 
financial assets become much more central to balance sheets and income generation. It 
also means a change in the way that non-financial firms typically fund themselves – 
coming to rely more on the issuance of equity and debt securities rather than traditional 
bank borrowing (Lapavitsas 2013: 219-222). All of these dynamics impact internal firm 
organization and management goals, as well as the wider tendency to crisis in capitalist 
economies.   
 
A second important feature of financialisation is the transformation in how individuals 
and households reproduce themselves on both a day-to-day and long-term basis (Albo et 
al 2010; Fine 2010; Lapavitsas 2013). Closely associated with the erosion of social 
provisioning of housing, education, health and aged care under neoliberalism, 
households have become increasingly dependent upon financial markets to ensure basic 
needs. This is reflected in the substantial growth of mortgage and housing finance, the 
increasingly direct linkage of pensions to the fortunes of capital markets, and the rise of 
various forms of market-based insurance as a means of managing risk. Lapavitsas notes 
that this process constitutes a  “financialization of personal revenue … through which 
the financial sector [mediates] the private provision of goods and services to households” 
(Lapavitsas 2013: 240). Another indicator, therefore, of the degree of financialisation 
within any economy, is the growth in lending for mortgages and personal consumption 
purposes (and their relative weight in overall loan volumes).  
 
Connected to these changes in both non-financial firm and household behaviour is a 
third major characteristic of financialisation – a transformation in the operations of 
banks. Here, commercial banks have moved away from a focus on corporate lending 
towards a direct role in mediating financial markets. They have become the nexus 
between financial markets and other capitalist firms, assisting the latter through the 
issuing of bonds, equities and derivatives. Dos Santos has shown empirically that that 
this transformation is reflected in the rising importance of ‘non-interest income’ to bank 
profits (Dos Santos 2009). Through their mediating role with financial markets, banks 
make money through fees, commissions, and their own proprietary fund management 
rather than lending directly to corporations. At the same time, as individuals have been 
pushed onto a dependence on the market, banks play another mediating role around 
“access to housing, durable consumer-goods, education, and increasingly health-care, 
though insurance-, mortgage- and other individual loans” (Dos Santos 2009: 182). 
Revenues from the lending to individuals and households thus become increasingly 
central to bank profitability.   
 
The question of how banking has changed within contemporary capitalism relates closely 
to the fourth important theme of this literature: the impact of financialisation on the 
structure and forms of the capitalist class itself. In a survey of earlier literature, Krippner 
points out that banks are frequently the most highly interlocked of all firms in the 
economy – cross-directorships across different firms most often involve bank directors 
(Krippner 2005: 201). This should not be read as implying the domination of industrial 
capital by banking capital, but rather as the emergence of a much more tightly 
interlocked capitalist class straddling both financial and non-financial firms. Indeed, the 
financialisation hypothesis is particularly suggestive on this point – pointing to the need 
to move beyond a simple antimony between ‘industry’ and ‘finance’ to instead consider 
the convergence of control that cuts across sectoral boundaries – what has been 
classically described by Hilferding, Lenin and others as ‘finance capital’. The leading 
position of this “new social type” (Krippner 2005: 201) signifies the presence of the same 
individuals “on the boards of the largest banks and [non-financial] corporations presiding 
over ... investments, organizing production, sales, and financing, and appropriating the 
profits of their integrated activities” (Zeitlin, quoted in Krippner 2005: 201). 
Financialisation, in other words, is intimately connected to the changing dynamics of 
class formation – a point to which I shall return below. 
 
These four themes of the financialisation literature inform much of the analysis that 
follows in Sections 3 and 4. As noted above, however, one of the weaknesses of the 
financialisation literature is its lack of critical attention to the spatiality of finance. The 
implications of this have recently been drawn out by Christophers (2013; 2015), who 
argues that we need to be very careful not to assume that financialisation can be 
understood (and measured) as a process occurring within bounded sets of social 
relations, neatly enclosed in distinct and separable national spaces that then impact on 
one another in a purely external fashion. This methodologically-nationalist bias leads 
much of the literature to view finance as inherently ‘national’, territorialised within 
discrete national containers that are posited as the natural vantage point from which to 
analyse the operation of markets and institutions (Christophers 2013: 239-241). 
Embedded in this dominant approach (although, almost always implicit), is the 
ontological assumption of a binary opposition between the interior and exterior of these 
national containers – the ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’. 
 
Taking on board Christophers’ critique, I fully agree that an understanding of 
financialisation needs to reject the notion that “explanations of ‘national’ economic 
outcomes” can be found “exclusively in ‘national’ economic dynamics” (Christophers 
2013: 243). Instead, we need much more sensitivity to the question of geographic scale 
(Smith 1993; Swyngedouw 1997; Brenner 2001) – incorporating the global, regional, 
national, sub-national, local and so forth, as different sites through which financial flows 
are territorialized, regulated and contested (Sokol 2013). Following Neil Brenner, this 
‘scale question’ should not be understood simply in the sense of pre-given boundaries, or 
different levels, which separate distinct geographic units from one another (2001: 599). 
Rather, scales are always internally-related, to employ the incisive concept of the Marxist 
philosopher Bertell Ollman – they do not exist as discrete ‘things’ but only as part of a 
larger whole (Ollman 2003). The relations between scales are essential to how scales 
themselves are actually constituted, and thus analytical focus must be placed on mapping 
the ways in which these intra-scalar relations are constantly in flux. The spatiality of 
capitalism, in other words, is characterised by a continual process of rescaling – a 
“perpetual reworking of the geographies of capital circulation and accumulation” 
(Swyngedouw 1997: 68) – that shifts the ways in which different scales are internally-
related and hierarchised.  
  
An appreciation of scale not only holds implications for how financialisation itself is 
interpreted and measured – but also for how social relations are conceived of, and 
change, within and across scales. Precisely because rescaling processes take place through 
“capital circulation and accumulation”, they necessarily involve the imbrication of 
different sets of social relations – and thus classes – across scales; confounding any 
conception of class as a set of self-enclosed social relations circumscribed, or contained, 
a priori within the national scale. This critical point directs our attention to the ways in 
which financialisation necessarily intersects with processes of class formation – a 
relationship which, in my opinion, has remained somewhat under-explored in the 
geography literature despite the latter’s often-explicit linkages to Marxian frameworks 
and geographers.  
 
Drawing together these analytical threads, what I aim to demonstrate below is that 
financialisation in the Arab world has been intrinsically associated with a rescaling of 
accumulation. It is a process that both works through, and acts to reproduce and 
reinforce, the tying together of financial markets across multiple spatial scales. My 
analysis emphasises the regional scale for reasons that will hopefully become evident. 
Importantly, however, this does not mean that one particular scale is the privileged site 
of accumulation; rather, accumulation at all scales has become more tightly entwined 
with regional finance capital. Not only does this reveal the distinctive ‘spaces of 
financialisation’ in the Arab world, it carries important insights into the character of class 
formation in the area. 
 
Before turning to this empirical investigation there is one feature of Arab finance that 
should be noted: the presence of Islamic finance (IF) and shariah-compliant products, 
which forbid the earning of interest and disallow investments believed to contradict 
Islamic principles. While IF constitutes a fairly small proportion of financial systems in 
most Arab countries, particularly those outside the Gulf, the region is viewed as a core 
zone of Islamic finance at a global level.4 For the thematic purposes of this article, 
however, IF should not be seen as fundamentally incongruous with the conceptualisation 
of financialisation described above. As with standard Marxian approaches to the circuit 
of capital, Islamic financial instruments seek an increase in an original sum of loanable 
money capital advanced over time (M…M’). Due to the interdiction on interest-bearing 
products IF technically differs from conventional finance in how this increase occurs; 
but in practice, IF instruments closely resemble their non-Islamic counterparts.5 This 
does not mean that IF is unimportant to how Arab financial markets operate – notably in 
relation to the region’s relationship with financial markets in East Asia, or the forms of 
internationalisation of Gulf finance capital (see below) – but a full exploration of these 
issues lies beyond the scope of this article.6  
 
3. Assessing Financialisation in the Arab World 
 
The recent trajectory of the political economy of the Arab world holds many similarities 
to other areas of the world. Driven by the 1980s debt crisis and the tightening grip of 
authoritarian regimes, most non-GCC Arab states embarked on liberalisation measures 
under the aegis of international financial institutions and their structural adjustment 
plans. These changes were hesitant at first – and met with substantial social protest – but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 According to the Islamic Financial Services Board, four Arab countries have ‘systematically important’ IF 
sectors (where Islamic assets constitute more than 15% of total banking assets): Saudi Arabia (51.3%), 
Kuwait (38%), Qatar (25.1%) and the UAE (17.4%) (IFSB 2015: 9).  
5 In the case of Islamic mortgages the bank buys the property on behalf of the individual client. The client 
then buys it back by paying higher instalments (murabahah) or through monthly payments that involve a 
repayment of the purchase price and a ‘rent’ until the property is fully owned (ijara). For Islamic bonds 
(sukuk), the bond-holder technically does not lend money, rather, they own a share of whatever the money 
was used to purchase, and earn income from profits generated by that asset or rental payments made by 
the sukuk’s issuer. At the end of the term, the issuer buys back the share of the asset owned by the lender 
(equivalent to paying the principal). Even forms of forward contracts exist within Islamic finance (salam 
and istisna’), despite the Islamic principle that commodities should not be exchanged prior to their coming 
into existence. 
6 See Bassens et al 2010 for further discussion. 
by the 1990s neoliberal perspectives had gained a hegemonic position within the policy 
arrangements of governments across the region (Hanieh 2013). Of course there was large 
variability in both the pace and scope of neoliberal reform – Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and 
Morocco stand out as those states where change was deepest – but no Arab country was 
immune to this shift. By 2008, the World Bank was acclaiming the Middle East as the 
second fastest region for economic reform in the world; Egypt – long held up as a 
regional role model by international financial institutions – was anointed as the world’s 
‘best reformer’ in the same year.  
 
The financial system has been a key strategic lever through which these policies have 
unfolded. From the 1950s to the 1980s, banking and the financial markets of most Arab 
countries had been state dominated – capital markets were anaemic or non-existent, 
interest rate levels and the supply of credit generally controlled by the state, and foreign 
financial institutions largely excluded from Arab markets.7 Through the initial decades of 
the 21st century, however, this picture changed appreciably. By early 2015, the average 
market share of state-owned banks in non-GCC Arab countries sat at 38 percent of total 
assets, down from 56% in 2001.8 Burgeoning capital markets emerged across the region 
in which foreign investors were active.9 Indicating the core function of the financial 
sector within wider neoliberal reform processes, this expansion of stock markets has 
been closely linked to deepening privatisation trends as the sell-off of state-owned assets 
occurred through stock market IPOs. Moreover, a number of mutual funds, insurance 
companies and other non-banking financial intermediaries were launched across the 
region. At the level of monetary policy, government ceilings on interest rates were lifted 
and market-based provision of credit expanded considerably. Again these aggregate 
trends hide significant variation, most notably in Algeria, Syria and Libya where financial 
systems remained largely under state control through the early 2000s – but even in these 
three countries the effects of ‘financial deepening’ were felt. 
 
Given these trends, what do the standard measures of financialisation indicate for the 
region? Table 1 shows four typical indicators for the magnitude of the financial sector 
and its relative importance across 14 Arab countries.  
 
< Table 1 > 
 
The data in Table 1 indicates that through the 2008-2014 period, all 11 Arab countries 
for which information was available had banking sector assets exceeding 70% of GDP 
(compared to only 7 countries in the 2000-2007 period). Moreover, in 7 out of 11 of 
these countries the ratio was well in excess of 100% (compared to only 4 reaching this 
level in the earlier period). Notably, these latter years coincided with the global financial 
crisis and the regional turmoil that followed the 2011 Arab uprisings – a period in which 
financial assets could have been expected to decline. With the exception of Kuwait and 
Syria, financial system deposits to GDP have also increased very significantly across all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Egypt nationalised its 27 banks following the 1952 revolution – merging these into four state-owned 
banks that would direct credit to target sectors. In Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, interest rates were set by 
the state, and all banks were compelled to lend to state institutions. Only in Lebanon was the banking 
system largely market-based, and for this reason the country formed an entrepot to the wider global 
economy.  
8 Calculations for 2015 using Bankscope Database; 2001 figure from Farazi et al (2011). 
9 The major exception is Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul market, the largest stock exchange in the region. Until 
recently, foreign investors were only able to invest in Tadawul through a limited number of mutual funds. 
In early 2015, however, the Saudi government announced that the market would be gradually opened to 
foreign investment. 
listed countries. Table 1 also points to the relative weight of financial companies on Arab 
stock markets. The proportion of market capitalisation represented by the finance sector 
ranges from just over 35% in Saudi Arabia, where oil-related companies predominate, to 
75.7% in Bahrain. In six out of ten countries, more than half of all stock market 
capitalisation is constituted by these companies. Even more strikingly, seven out of ten 
countries have more than 60% of total stock market profits earned by financial 
companies. For Bahrain, Jordan, the UAE and Tunisia, close to three-quarters of all 
profits in listed companies are connected to finance. In some countries this ratio has 
increased extremely rapidly – in Egypt, for example, finance-related profits constituted 
11.2% of profits in 2005, 27.9% of profits in 2009, and have now reached 69.4% of total 
listed profits.  For Jordan, the financial sector’s share of total market profits jumped by 
nearly 25 percentage points between 2009 and 2015.10 
 
Accordingly, it appears from these standard indicators that there has been a definite 
growth in the magnitude and weight of the financial sector across the Arab world. As 
discussed above, however, an important feature of financialisation – perhaps more 
significant than simply the relative size of the financial sector – is the way in which it 
changes accumulation patterns for all firms, including the non-financial sector. What 
happens when we turn to examining this ‘financialisation of the non-financial’? 
Unfortunately, the kind of data that researchers have used to measure this trend in other 
contexts is not directly available in any consistent or longitudinally satisfactory manner 
for the Arab world. I have thus developed an alternative indicator (Figure 1) that 
attempts to measure the degree to which ‘non-financial’ firms are enmeshed with 
financial markets. This data draws upon the publically available consolidated balance 
sheets for 22 of the largest non-financial companies across the GCC, Egypt and Jordan 
(three key financial markets in the region). Taken together, these companies make up 
around one-half of both the total market capitalisation, and total assets, for the top 100 
non-financial companies across these countries. They include the largest Arab firms 
operating in the chemical and minerals, food, telecommunications, utilities, ports, 
logistics, aircraft, and cement sectors. Using their audited annual balance sheets from 
2003 to 2014 (in Arabic, where English is unavailable) I have determined the proportion 
of company assets that are dependent upon, or linked to, financial markets. These 
include: equities available for sale, short-term investments held for trading, derivatives, 
and investments in associate companies. These figures have been weighted according to 
the company’s market capitalisation (in US$) for the specified year, and then the two-year 
moving average of the total calculated. The aim of this exercise is to develop a proxy 
indicator for non-financial companies’ income – and thus accumulation – that depends 
upon financial markets/instruments rather than simply revenue arising from the 
production and sale of commodities.  
 
< Figure 1> 
 
Figure 1 strongly suggests the growing centrality of financial markets to Arab non-
financial companies. The proportion of financial assets to total assets grew from around 
4.5% in 2003/2004 to 19.5% in 2013/2014 – a remarkable and very sharp jump for just 
ten years. It should be emphasised that these companies are market leaders in their 
respective sectors, and a study of smaller or medium-size companies may not show 
identical trends; but the figures appear to confirm that financial markets play a much 
more important role in the business strategies of the region’s most significant non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Calculated from stock exchange data. 
financial firms. This shift has been particularly notable over the latest five-year period, 
but interestingly there was surprisingly little decrease in this ratio during the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 – despite the fact that all Arab markets experienced double-digit 
declines at this time. This resilience to crisis is perhaps an indication that financialisation 
represents more than simply an efflorescent market phenomenon, but actually marks a 
qualitative shift in how accumulation takes place in the region.  
 
Changing ro le  o f  banks? 
 
The final set of indicators for financialisation concern the transformation in the 
operation of financial institutions – particularly banks – over the last quarter of a century. 
Table 2 shows the proportion of non-interest income to total income for commercial 
banks across 14 Arab countries. This ratio has fluctuated much more sharply than the 
other data discussed above: moving rapidly upwards from 1998 to 2007 and then 
dropping again in the period following the 2008-2009 global economic crisis and the 
recent Arab uprisings. Nonetheless, despite these fluctuations, the overall proportion has 
generally trended upwards, with non-interest income reaching close to 35% of banking 
income across all countries during the 2010-2013 period, up from just over 27% in 1998-
2001. Only Egyptian banks witnessed a significant decline between these two periods.11 It 
is also noteworthy that during the ‘boom’ years of 2004-2007, the GCC countries 
experienced a very sharp jump in this ratio, particularly in three of the largest banking 
markets of the region – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar.  
 
< Table 2 > 
 
The rise in non-interest income likely points to the growing role of Arab banks as 
mediating links between financial markets and corporations (see Dos Santos above). In 
this sense, a greater proportion of non-interest income – achieved through fees, 
commissions and bank’s own trading of financial instruments – is an expected corollary 
to the financialised turn of Arab capital in general. At the same time, household 
borrowing has become much more central to the loan profiles of banks. Lending for 
personal consumption now makes up around 40% of total bank credit to the private 
sector in Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Egypt and Tunisia – for the latter two countries, this 
figure has approximately doubled over the last decade.12 Personal consumption loans also 
constitute a significant proportion of bank assets in Qatar (29%), the UAE (32%), Saudi 
Arabia (26%) and Jordan (26%). Placed alongside the recent expansion of household 
mortgage markets across key Arab states13, these figures confirm that individuals and 
households are increasingly reliant upon financial markets to meet their day-to-day needs, 
and, as a consequence, the lending profiles of Arab banks have been transformed. 
 
The data analysed in this section must be treated with some caution – statistics for the 
region frequently lack depth and there are significant gaps in coverage. Cross-country 
comparisons are not always possible due to different underlying variables. It is also 
important not to overstate these trends. For many of the standard indicators typically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In Egypt, the proportion of non-interest income fell by around 20 percentage points in both 2008-2009 
and 2010-2011. 
12 Figures mid-2015, except for Tunisia, end-2014 (calculated from Central Bank annual reports). 
13 One standard measure of housing finance is mortgage loans as a % of (current) GDP. From 2010-2015, 
this figure has increased from 16% to 18.1% in Jordan, 11.8% to 19% in Lebanon, 10.7% to 16% in 
Morocco, and 13.3% to 18% in Tunisia. For Tunisia, it has recently been estimated that 40% of the active 
population’s income is spent on mortgage debt (UN-Habitat 2011: 63). 
used to measure ‘financial deepening’ by international financial institutions – the 
penetration of non-bank financial institutions (pension and mutual funds, insurance 
companies and so forth), the depth of corporate debt markets, and the ability to trade 
futures and derivatives14 – the Arab world lags behind other regions. Nonetheless, we 
should not think of financialisation as a closed process with a definitive end-point, but 
rather as an ongoing feature of contemporary capitalism. In this respect the conclusions 
are clear: the principal characteristics of the Arab financial system – from the magnitude 
of the financial sector, to the behavior of non-financial firms, and the changing role of 
banks and bank-lending – all confirm that the trends of financialisation noted in the 
general literature are applicable to the region itself.  
 
4. Rescaling Financialisation 
 
What happens, however, if we unsettle the methodological nationalism that characterises 
many of the assumptions behind the indicators above, and consider financialisation 
through the lens of other scales? In order to answer this question, I aim to demonstrate 
that financialisation in the Arab world has occurred alongside a rescaling of 
accumulation, in which accumulation processes at all scales are increasingly entangled 
with, and shaped by, those at the regional scale. Principally, this rescaling has been driven 
by the internationalisation of Gulf-based finance capital throughout the Arab world. 
Financialisation, therefore, is as much a reflection of this scalar process linked to the 
internationalisation of capital, as it is simply a quantitative growth or change in the ways 
that financial markets intermediate the behavior of firms and individuals at the national 
level.  
 
But before spelling out this argument in greater depth, it is necessary to more precisely 
delineate what I mean by GCC ‘finance capital’ – a term that has hitherto been used 
fairly loosely. In many ways, the case of the GCC substantiates how classical Marxist 
theorists – including Hilferding, Lenin and others – framed the notion of finance capital 
(see Marois 2012 for overview). While these conceptions differ in emphasis, finance 
capital is broadly understood as the merging of both financial and industrial capital 
within large conglomerates that are closely connected to the state apparatus. This 
amalgamation denotes the emergence of a class that cuts across (and controls) both 
financial and non-financial activities. Banks and other financial institutions play very 
important roles as a pivotal nexus of this process, although – as noted above – this 
should not be read as simply the domination of banks over industry as it is sometimes 
interpreted.  
 
Similarly, within GCC capitalism, accumulation is dominated by large business 
conglomerates that are typically structured around holding companies straddling all 
moments of the circuit of capital (Hanieh 2011). Subsidiaries and a dense network of 
interlocking directorships mean that these conglomerates control a wide variety of 
industrial, trading and financial activities. These conglomerates generally originate from 
influential merchant groups or ruling families. In many cases, their emergence was linked 
to a role as contractors to foreign oil companies, the import trade, or construction 
activities associated with the early urbanisation of the Gulf states in the first quarter of 
the 20th century.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Aside from Kuwait, future and options trading have not been possible in Arab stock markets. The 
NASDAQ Dubai exchange launched a derivatives market in 2008 but as a result of the global crisis it did 
not succeed and the last contract traded there in 2011. 
For the purposes of this article there are two features of GCC finance capital that require 
particular emphasis.15 First, it is important not to place an artificial division between the 
‘state’ (and thus the ruling families) and the capitalist class itself (Hanieh 2015). The 
ruling families of the Gulf certainly dominate the political apparatus of the state, but they 
also need to be seen as part of the capitalist class – indeed, they often form the central 
core of this class. Concretely, this means that movement between the ‘public’ and 
‘private’ spheres is extremely fluid, and that individuals from the ruling family will 
frequently own private businesses alongside holding positions in the state apparatus. 
There is thus a tight interlocking between ‘state’ and ‘private’ capital; privately-owned 
companies will often have public officials (including members of the ruling family) on 
their boards, and, equally, the boards of state-owned companies will include prominent 
business people. In a closely related sense, government funds invest alongside (and in) 
these private conglomerates or associated companies – in this manner, state revenues 
from the sale of hydrocarbons are redirected into the accumulation circuits of GCC 
finance capital. 
 
The second important feature of GCC finance capital is the centrality of banks and other 
financial institutions to the underlying configuration of the large business conglomerates. 
All of the leading banks in the GCC have representatives of these business 
conglomerates sitting on their boards and as investors (alongside state capital). Gulf 
banks are by far the largest in the Arab world (see below), and, unlike other Arab 
countries, the ownership of these banks remains generally in national hands. In this 
manner, GCC banks act as a critical nodal point for different fractions of Gulf finance 
capital and the state, acting to pool and redistribute funds through a variety of markets 
and economic activities. This is not meant to imply that banks ‘dominate’ industry or 
vice-versa; rather, these financial institutions form a pivotal site through which Gulf 
finance capital comes to envelop all moments of accumulation.  
 
An excellent illustration of these patterns is shown by the National Bank of Kuwait 
(NBK), which was established by a group of Kuwaiti businessmen in 1952 as the first 
locally-owned Gulf bank. Today, NBK is the sixth largest bank in the Arab world (by 
assets) and the largest in Kuwait, controlling more than one-fifth of all banking assets in 
the country. NBK is listed on Kuwait’s stock exchange (indeed, it was the first 
shareholding company established in the GCC), and is controlled by the most important 
segments of Kuwaiti finance capital. Its board of directors, for example, has 
representatives from the Al Kharafi Group – one of the original founders of the bank –
best known for the massive Kuwaiti Food Company (Americana) that owns a vast 
network of restaurants and food manufacturing plants across the Middle East. 
Confirming the ways in which GCC finance capital straddles all economic sectors, 
Kharafi also controls some of the region’s largest industrial and commercial companies, 
including firms involved in construction, cement production, civil engineering, real estate 
development, tourism, and information technology. Alongside Al Kharafi, other 
principal owners of NBK include the Al-Bahar, Al-Sager, and Al-Fulaij Groups – each of 
these conglomerates similarly span a range of business sectors. Finally, NBK is closely 
connected to the Kuwaiti state itself – with the government-run Public Institution for 
Social Security holding a major stake in the company. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 An additional feature of GCC capitalism not discussed here but that should nonetheless be noted is the 
region’s overwhelming reliance on a non-citizen workforce. This class structure underpins the unique 
configuration of state-citizen relations, and has facilitated the spatial displacement of crises at key moments 
(e.g. the 2008-2009 global downturn). See Hanieh (2011; 2015) for further elaboration. 
Internat ional isat ion o f  GCC f inance capi tal  
 
Across the entire GCC, finance capital has been characterized by these patterns of 
accumulation and institutional forms for many decades. But since the beginning of the 
21st century, there has been a major shift in the spatial organisation of these capital groups, 
with Gulf finance capital (both state and private) expanding rapidly throughout the Arab 
world.16 Through this process of internationalisation, the GCC has come to dominate 
cross-border capital flows in the region. From 2003 to 2015, for example, the GCC was 
responsible for a remarkable 42.5% of total greenfield FDI in non-GCC Arab states.17 
More than half of all foreign investments in Jordan, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Palestine and 
Tunisia came from the Gulf over this time. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) figures 
provide further evidence of these trends. From 2010 to 2015, European, Gulf, and 
North American investors spent just over 20 billion euros on M&A in the Arab World – 
the GCC share of this was 44.7%.18 Moreover, these figures significantly understate the 
level of internationalisation over this period – they do not include, for example, the 
considerable government-to-government flows of aid from the Gulf that have been 
apparent in recent years, and do not necessarily incorporate portfolio investments by 
Gulf firms in regional stock markets. 
 
The particular phasing of these flows is not simply the result of greater quantities of 
petrodollars associated with higher oil prices; rather this internationalisation of Gulf 
capital has been directly connected to the deepening neoliberal turn of Arab 
governments.  In addition to the financial sector measures noted earlier, neoliberal 
policies brought the privatisation of state-owned industries, the liberalisation of foreign 
ownership laws, and measures aimed at attracting foreign investment flows (Hanieh 
2013: 47-98) – Gulf finance capital was a prime beneficiary of this policy turn. In this 
manner, neoliberalism and the internationalisation of Gulf capital need to be thought of 
as co-constitutive and mutually-reinforcing processes; their inherently cross-scalar nature 
confounds any methodologically nationalist readings of the Arab world’s political 
economy. 
 
This changing spatiality of Gulf finance capital returns us to the question of 
financialisation and the regional scale. Financial institutions and financial markets, as 
many scholars have noted, are key enablers of internationalisation itself. It is thus not 
surprising that – as part of its internationalisation – GCC finance capital has become 
deeply involved in the regional financial circuit. Table 3 illustrates this process through 
examining Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) data for banks, insurance and financial 
services in nine Arab countries outside of the GCC. The data captures the relative weight 
of GCC, European and North American capital flows19 into the Arab financial sector 
from 2006 to 2015 (1st quarter).  
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16 This does not mean that Gulf investments went primarily to the region (US and Europe remained the 
principal focus). Relatively, however, the Gulf’s weight within regional accumulation circuits grew in 
comparison to historical patterns and other foreign investment sources. 
17  Figures from country information reports, Arab Investment & Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 
http://www.iaigc.net/ (in Arabic). Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Palestine 
and Algeria. 
18 Investment from EU (28), North America and the GCC, going to Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. Calculated from Zephyr M&A database. Figures include only 
confirmed M&A deals with known values. 
19 Virtually all FDI flows into the region originate from one of these three blocs. 
 
The results both confirm the dramatic internationalisation of Gulf finance capital over 
the last decade, as well as the Gulf’s weight in the regional finance circuit. In all 
countries, with the exception of Morocco, the overwhelming proportion of capital flows 
into finance has come from the Gulf. Taken in total across the nine countries, 65% of 
the 14.3 billion euros of foreign investment in the financial sector over this period 
originated from the Gulf, with most of the remainder (31%) coming from EU-28 
countries. North American investment has been negligible. If Morocco is excluded from 
these figures, the Gulf’s proportion reaches a staggering 72.7% of total investment 
originating from the three areas. Arab financial liberalisation, in other words, has been 
primarily and overwhelmingly characterised by the internationalisation of Gulf finance 
capital. 
 
Table 4 provides further corroboration of this process and its profound implications for 
banking at the national scale. The data is drawn from an examination of shareholder 
structures and boards of directors for 280 banks across the eleven listed countries. It 
shows the degree to which GCC-related banks20 control (i) a country’s total banking 
assets, and (ii) total non-state owned banking assets. The results reveal that banks closely 
connected to GCC finance capital completely dominate the non-state owned banking 
systems in Jordan, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Lebanon. In each of these states, GCC-
related banks hold more than 50% of all non-state owned bank assets – reaching a 
remarkable 86% in the case of Jordan. In Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, and Libya, GCC-
related banks also hold a significant share of non-state banking assets – ranging from 
19.3% to 45%. In four of these latter countries (Yemen, Tunisia, Iraq and Libya), GCC 
investors hold more of the banking sector than any other foreign country (for Algeria, 
French-related banks hold 52% of non-state banking assets). Moreover, Table 4 shows 
that in those countries where high levels of state-ownership persist (Algeria, Libya, Iraq 
and Syria), the GCC’s proportion of overall bank assets is considerably less than that 
within the non-state banking sector alone. In those states where the private ownership of 
banks is most advanced – such as Jordan and Lebanon – GCC-related banks have 
overwhelming predominance. Bank privatisation, in other words, is intertwined with, and 
reinforced by, the internationalisation of GCC finance capital.  
 
< Table 4 > 
 
The one outlier to the overall trends observed in Table 4 is Morocco, where French and 
Spanish banking groups dominate foreign ownership. There are several indications, 
however, that this is changing. In 2014, the Arab world’s largest bank (by assets), Qatar 
National Bank, launched its African strategy that targets Morocco as its base for the 
North African market. QNB has plans to purchase the largest bank in Morocco, 
Attijarawafa Bank, which would completely transform the ownership structures of 
Morocco’s banking sector. Moreover, Morocco illustrates how Islamic finance appears to 
be emerging as an important vehicle for the regional expansion of GCC finance capital. 
Islamic banks have hitherto been outlawed in the country due to the elite’s traditional 
hostility to Islamism, but, in January 2015, new laws were passed that allowed the 
establishment of IF institutions. According to industry analysts, the passage of these laws 
was an explicit “attempt to attract Gulf money” (Golcer 2014: 4). Confirming this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This term refers to any domestic bank that fulfills one or more of the following characteristics: (1) GCC 
shareholders hold 20% or more of the bank’s shares, (2) a minimum of two GCC investors sit on the 
board of directors, (3) the bank is a subsidiary of another GCC financial institution. In this sense, the term 
reflects the degree of cross-border, intra-regional enmeshing of class relations within banking. 
assessment, the Qatar International Islamic Bank (QIIB) announced in late December 
2015 that it was launching a joint venture with a major Moroccan bank, CIH Bank, to 
establish the first new Islamic Finance bank in Morocco (in which QIIB would hold 40% 
of assets).  
 
The GCC-related banks analyzed in Table 4 are often the largest and most important 
financial institutions in their respective countries – a fact confirmed by their weight in 
regional stock markets. Out of all the banks listed on stock markets across Lebanon, 
Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Syria and Iraq, six of the largest seven (by market 
capitalisation) are GCC-related.21 Strikingly, GCC-related banks constitute 57% of the 
entire market capitalisation of all banks listed on these seven markets.  The ten largest 
GCC-related banks alone control just under 40% of all listed banking assets in these 
seven countries – five of these ten banks are direct subsidiaries of GCC banks. 
Moreover, the weight of GCC finance capital in Arab markets appears to be deepening 
despite the regional crises of recent years.22  
 
One consequence of these trends is the accentuating uneven development of the regional 
scale as a whole – a divergence between the weight of GCC finance capital and the rest 
of the region. This growing unevenness is shown by aggregate figures for bank profits 
and bank assets. In 2000, for example, banks located in the GCC held 62% of all banking 
assets in the Arab world.23  By 2014, this figure had reached 71.7%. The pre-tax profits 
of GCC banks constituted 70% of all Arab bank profits in 2012-2014, up from an 
average of 57% in 2007-2008. Even those characteristics of bank income directly 
associated with financialisation indicate this polarisation – in 2014, more than 70% of all 
non-interest income earned across the entire Arab banking system flowed to GCC-based 
banks. Most pointedly, these ‘national’ figures do not take into account the ways in which 
GCC-based capital has expanded through the forms of internationalisation indicated in 
Tables 3 and 4 – at a purely quantitative level, they thus considerably understate the 
actual position of the GCC within Arab financial markets. 
 
It is important to underline, however, that the Gulf’s centrality to Arab financialisation 
should not be viewed simply as a predatory, hostile take-over of other Arab capitalist 
classes. Rather, the cross-scalar knitting together of accumulation under the hegemony of 
Gulf finance capital is better seen as signifying a regional entwinement of class structures, 
with considerable benefits often extending to non-GCC Arab capitalists. Gulf capital’s 
involvement in many of the banks analysed in Table 4, for example, has enabled leading 
Egyptian, Jordanian and other Arab capital groups to embark on their own processes of 
expansion and internationalisation.24 In other cases, large non-GCC Arab conglomerates 
rely primarily upon Gulf markets despite being formally based outside of the GCC. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Calculated from stockmarket data. 
22 In Egypt, for example, GCC-based banks have dramatically increased their weight since 2013 – this 
includes the UAE-based Emirates-NBD acquisition of BNP-Paribas (Egypt), the sale of National Societe 
General Bank to Qatar National Bank, and the purchase of Greek-owned Piraeus Bank by Kuwait’s Al 
Ahli Bank.  
23 Calculated from Bankscope database. Countries included are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
24 One example is the Bank of Palestine, founded in 1960 by the Gaza-based Al Shawa family. In 2008, the 
Kuwaiti conglomerate MA Kharafi & Sons became BoP’s largest shareholder, taking 9% of the bank’s 
capital, with the Al Shawa family retaining a significant holding. Following this investment, BoP 
significantly expanded, increasing its number of branches by more than 50% in five years, and becoming 
the leading Palestinian bank in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
is a particularly notable characteristic of capitalist classes in Palestine, Jordan and 
Lebanon – and in some prominent examples the relationship with the GCC is recognized 
by joint citizenship.25A more recent indication of the cross-regional interlocking of 
accumulation is a trend of Arab capital groups utilising GCC stock markets as their 
principal location for IPOs and raising credit.26 These examples – to which many more 
could be added – reveal how GCC financial circuits are not external to the national scale, 
but rather, should be seen as internally related to processes of class formation and 




Taken together, these profoundly spatial dimensions of financialisation in the Arab world 
indicate both the consolidation of the power of GCC finance capital at the level of the 
regional scale, and, simultaneously, the interiorisation of this class within other Arab 
states. Viewed from the perspective of the regional scale, the key features of 
financialisation outlined in Section 3 – the growing size and weight of financial assets and 
financial profits, the increasing importance of financial income for non-financial firms, 
the changing nature of bank lending, and so forth – can all be understood as reflecting, 
enabling, and girding this projection of regional power by Gulf-based finance capital. 
Financialisation in the Arab world thus not only signifies the assertion of financial 
markets within individual states, but a rescaling of accumulation itself; the imbrication of 
all scales within regionally articulated circuits dominated by Gulf finance capital. 	  
This has important implications for understanding many contemporary features of the 
region. For one, the presence of both deepening financialisation and GCC-dominated 
pan-regional linkages is found in numerous key industries: construction, agribusiness, 
logistics, transport, telecommunications, Islamic finance, retail, renewable energy, and so 
forth. The future trajectories of these strategic sectors will be largely shaped by their 
entwinement with Gulf financial circuits. This regional interlocking also undermines any 
conception of a binary opposition between foreign and domestic capital, in which the 
latter is invested with some kind of progressive political potential (the ras al-mal al-watani 
– ‘patriotic bourgeoisie’ – heralded by some Arab Left and nationalist movements). 
Instead, the dynamics discussed here point to how the Arab ‘national’ bourgeoisie has 
become largely inseparable from accumulation in the Gulf. This is perhaps one reason 
why the GCC has come to embody and defend the interests of other Arab business and 
state elites in such a prominent manner – as the various regional alliances established in 
the wake of the 2011-2012 revolts confirm. 	  
More generally, approaching financialisation from this perspective reveals why analyses 
of financial processes need to move beyond a view of the national scale as a self-enclosed 
and ‘natural’ spatial container of social relations. When we measure, for example, the 
rapid growth in consumer and real estate lending in Jordan, we are also seeing the 
manner in which GCC finance capital increasingly intermediates Jordanian social 
relations. When we observe the growing proportion of financial profits on the Egyptian 
stock market, we are simultaneously mapping how Egyptian capitalism has become 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Lebanon’s Hariri family (who also hold Saudi citizenship) is an archetypal example, but many others 
exist. 
26 A good example was the 2015 announcement that the Egyptian conglomerate Orascom Construction 
would move its primary share listing to Dubai and keep a secondary listing in Cairo. Orascom is controlled 
by the most important business family in Egypt, the Sawaris, and the decision to shift its listing to the Gulf 
is highly indicative of the orientation of Arab capital to Gulf financial markets.  
closely enmeshed with circuits of accumulation in the GCC. Financialisation, to employ 
one of Marx’s favourite concepts, constitutes a ‘form of appearance’ of this shifting 
spatialisation of accumulation; a renascent reworking of space and scale, such that the 
dynamics of accumulation and class formation emerge anew. Beyond the direct 
implications for scholars concerned with the political economy of the Middle East, these 
examples hold potentially useful insights for other geographical locations. Their 
specificities will clearly differ from place to place, but the Arab world provides a 
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